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UNCITRAL'S MODEL LAW ON
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY:
A WORKABLE PROTECTION FOR
TRANSNATIONAL INVESTMENT AT LAST
I. INTRODUCTION
The steady growth of transnational lending and the ten-
dency of largely held corporations to possess foreign assets
combine to foster growth of industry and technology while
indirectly contributing to an overall higher standard of living.
"Nearly a third of U.S.-based, large, publicly held companies
own property in foreign countries and these companies usually
separately incorporate those foreign holdings in the particular
foreign countries."' Similarly, modern bankruptcy cases in-
creasingly involve assets located in various countries.2 Howev-
er, the current state of international bankruptcy law presents
foreign investors with a great deal of risk and uncertainty, and
is unacceptable if cross-border commerce is expected to
flourish. While creditors continue to suffer losses resulting
from preferential treatment in foreign bankruptcy courts,3
1. Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post Univer-
salist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 723 nn.147-48 (1999).
An examination of cases in the Bankruptcy Research Database
reveals that of 266 large, public companies filing for bankruptcy reorgani-
zation in the United States from 1980 through 1997, 83 (31%) indicated
in their 10-Ks that they owned property outside the United States. Of
the 68 companies in the Bankruptcy Research Database with foreign
property that disclosed where their subsidiaries were incorporated, 64
(94%) named one or more foreign countries. Of the 65 that indicated the
number of foreign countries involved, 49 (75%) had corporations in at
least the number of countries in which they had property.
Id. (citing Lynn M. LoPucki, Bankruptcy Research Database (1999)) (unpublished
database, on file with author).
2. NATIONAL BANKRupTcy REVIEW COMMISSION, NATIONAL BANKRUPiTY RE-
VIEW COMMISSION REPORT 351 (vol. I, Oct. 20, 1997). See also Leslie A. Burton,
Toward an International Bankruptcy Policy in Europe: Four Decades in Search of
a Treaty, 5 ANN. SuRv. INTL & COMP. L. 205 (1999).
3. See Noel Fung, Jakarta Bankruptcy Court Rejects Foreign Banks' Claim on
BII Unit, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1999, at 3. "This decision is another setback
for foreign creditors, who so far have had limited success in retrieving their loans
through the bankruptcy court . . . ." Id. See also Chinese Government Not to Bail
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higher risks4 are needlessly placed on transnational investors:
risks which increase the cost of international trading and stifle
the emergence of an otherwise burgeoning world-wide econo-
my.5 While the international community has attempted to
respond to the need for global, uniform bankruptcy rules,6 it
has not failed to come up with an acceptable solution.7 The
most recent attempt at providing an international mechanism
for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency is the Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model Law), adopted by the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL), in 1997.8 Although still in its infancy, the Model
Law already has been criticized as yet another failed attempt
Out ITICs: Banker, CHINA BUS. INFORIMATION NETWORK, Jan. 20, 1999. "The terms
of the GITIC bankruptcy provided for payment to some 25,000 individual Chinese
creditors, but did not give international creditors any assurances that they would
be repaid." Id. See generally China: Court Promises Fair Treatment of Debt Repay-
ing, CHINA Bus. INFORMATION NETWORK, Apr. 23, 1999 (discussing bankruptcy of
Guangdong International Trust and Investment Corp (GITIC)). GITIC is a compa-
ny owned by the Chinese government. See id. Three of its subsidiaries faced
claims from 175 foreign creditors for 32.341 billion Yuan and 365 mainland credi-
tors for 14.68 billion Yuan.
4. See infra Part II.B. These risks ultimately will result in the inequitable
distribution of assets. Acknowledging creditors' fears of inequitable distribution in
transnational insolvency cases, Li Qi, deputy judge of the Guangdong Provincial
People's High Court in China, felt the necessity to assure creditors that "[a]Il
debts, whether on the mainland or outside the country, will be equally compensat-
ed." China: Court Promises Fair Treatment of Debt Repaying, supra note 3.
5. See Hon. Justice J.M. Farley, A Judicial Perspective on International Coop-
eration in Insolvency Cases, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 12 (1998). "We must avoid
becoming bogged down in non-productive diversions that are destructive to the
value of the enterprise." Id. See also Burman and Westbrook, infra note 10, at
1386. "Progress in this area of the law will have a significant effect on interna-
tional commercial finance and investment." Id.
6. Examples of such attempts include the International Bar Association,
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, June 1, 1996 [hereinafter Concordat]; European
Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1223, 1226
[hereinafter EU Convention]; Scandinavian Convention, Nov. 7, 1933, 155 L.N.T.S.
133, 138.
7. See David H. Culmer, The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat and Custom.
ary International Law: Is it Ripe Yet?, 14 CONN. J. INTL L. 563, 566 (1999). "The
domestic swing toward cooperation with foreign proceedings has not been accompa-
nied by the formation of treaties aimed at cross-border cooperation." Id. "In Eu-
rope, decades of work has yielded little fruit in terms of a cross-border bankruptcy
regime." Id. For a further discussion of "failed attempts," see Burton, supra note
2.
8. U.N. Commission on International Trade Law's Model Law on Cross-Bor-
der Insolvency, G.A. Res. 52/158, UNCITRAL, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Doc.
A/52/17 (May 30, 1997), 36 I.L.M. 1386 [hereinafter Model Law].
at filling the vacuum in cross-border insolvency law.9 While
the Model Law may not solve every problem in international
bankruptcy, this Note asserts that it is a promising step to-
ward alleviating a substantial number of the significant obsta-
cles to cooperation and the equal distribution of assets. This
Note further urges United Nations Member States to incorpo-
rate the Model Law into their existing domestic bankruptcy
law. The national uniform bankruptcy code in the United
States has taken almost 100 years to develop,' ° and the Code
has been in a perpetual state of amendment ever since. Given
some time to develop, this Note asserts that the Model Law
will prove to be a substantial and necessary step toward reduc-
ing risks faced by foreign investors and multinational corpora-
tions. Not only will the Model Law increase cooperation be-
tween courts involved in transnational liquidation and reor-
ganization, proceedings, but it will also maximize the equal
distribution of assets to creditors in cross-border insolvency
proceedings and provide foreign investors with greater predict-
ability. This, in turn, will promote the increase of cross-border
trading and the emergence of a single, world-wide market.
Part II of this Note will address the two general theories
of transnational insolvency law: universalism and
territorialism, and discuss their various flaws. Part III will
address the international community's attempts to resolve
these issues by creating various transnational insolvency
agreements including the Cross-Border Insolvency Concor-
dat" adopted by the International Bar Association, the Euro-
pean Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bank-
ruptcy,12 and the European Union Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings, which was accepted by the 15 European Union
national governments in 1995, but "collapsed due to Britain's
last-minute refusal to sign."'4 This part of the Note also will
9. See John A. Barret, Various Legislative Attempts With Respect to Bank-
ruptcies Involving More Than One Country, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 557 (1998).
10. See Harold Burman & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Introductory Note to
Model Law, 36 I.L.M. 1386, 1387 (1997).
11. Concordat, supra note 6.
12. European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy (Is-
tanbul Convention), opened for signature, June 5, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 165 (1991).
13. EU Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, supra note 6.
14. European Union: European Lawmakers Seek Common Rules Governing
Bankruptcy, BNA INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & FINANCE DAILY NEWS, May 11, 1999
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consider the extent to which these agreements have remedied
the flaws existing under territorialism and universalism. Part
IV of this Note will evaluate the potential success of the Model
Law in reconciling the underlying concepts of territoriality
(state sovereignty) and universalism (international coopera-
tion). Part IV further will analyze the Model Law's provisions
and assess the extent to which they address the weaknesses
characteristic of the current state of transnational insolvency
law. Part V will then conclude that the Model Law is an ac-
ceptable solution to the current weaknesses with the existing
territorialist state of transnational insolvency and urge United
Nations Member States to enact the Model Law promulgated
by UNCITRAL, so that nations may assume their obligations
under international law and contribute to a cooperative trans-
national insolvency environment.
II. TERRITORIALITY AND UNIVERSALISM: TWO THEORIES OF
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
A. Where We Are Now: Territoriality and the "Grab Rule"
The present lack of international cooperation in transna-
tional bankruptcies has been referred to as the "grab rule,"15
but is most often defined as the territorialist theory of transna-
tional insolvency. Under this theory, a debtor's assets in each
country are essentially "grabbed" by local courts and distrib-
uted only to those creditors who appear at (and are aware of)
the local proceeding. 6 Naturally, such creditors tend to be
primarily local." Under the territorialist approach, foreign
insolvency proceedings are seldom recognized by other
states. 8 Territorialism is premised on respecting the sover-
eignty of individual states,19 and reflects the notion that one
country's bankruptcy proceedings only have legal effect in that
country.20 As such, courts of territorialist countries refuse to
at dS.
15. See Culmer, supra note 7, at 575 (asserting that the international commu-
nity has yet to embrace universalism).
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at
351.
19. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 742.
20. See XlSchenkius, Rb., 6 July 1993 KG, 42 NETH. INTL L. REV. 121 (1995),
[Vol. XXVI:31180
recognize foreign orders from outside their national borders.2'
Thus, even if a creditor fully has recovered from a debtor in
one state, that creditor still may race with other creditors to
yet another state to seize more of the debtor's assets. Today,
nearly all countries refuse to help each other in the settlement
of claims unless such help has been previously provided for by
contract.22 The ultimate result of the "grab rule" is to create
an environment that places unnecessary risks2" on those con-
ducting multinational business transactions. Every creditor
who deals with a foreign corporation impliedly subjects himself
to the laws of the foreign government of the corporation with
which he voluntarily contracts. As such, creditors investing
in foreign countries are required to take frightening risks,
including the risk that a return on that investment may never
come. These risks result from the major disadvantages of the
territorialist approach to transnational insolvency, which may
be grouped into four categories.
B. Four General Problems Generated by Territorialism
Perhaps the largest drawback of territorialism is that it
encourages a race of the diligent around the world wherever
creditors can find and seize assets belonging to the debtor.
Thus, international insolvency proceedings involving one debt-
or and multiple creditors often run concurrently in a variety of
states, with creditors competing with one another to seize a
debtor's assets. The failure to recognize foreign insolvency
proceedings defeats the goal of equal distribution of a debtor's
assets, lowers the return to all creditors, and makes reorgani-
zation of a corporation virtually impossible.' Territorialism
also results in favoritism of local creditors" (to the detriment
(in which a Netherlands court held that a bankruptcy commenced in the Nether-
lands only applies in the Netherlands out of respect for the sovereignty of other
countries). Id.
21. See Burton, supra note 2, at 209.
22. See European Union: European Lawmakers Seek Common Rules governing
Bankruptcy, supra note 14.
23. These risks include the possibility that a creditor will not recover any of
its debts, or that recovery will be inequitable.
24. Canada S. Ry v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883).
25. See Felixistow Dock & Ry Co. v. U.S. Lines, Inc., [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
76.
26. See China: Court Promises Fair Treatment of Debt Repaying, supra note 3.
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of foreign creditors) by domestic courts and an overall lack of
cooperation among courts, trustees and creditors in the inter-
national community. For purposes of this Note, these pervasive
and overlapping problems may be more accurately studied by
grouping them into four general categories: 1) lack of notice to
foreign creditors; 2) little predictability for international inves-
tors; 3) inefficient multiple proceedings; and 4) parochialism.
1. Lack of Notice to Foreign Creditors
A major problem with territorialism is that of notice.27
Creditors involved in a race for the assets attempt to "beat"
other creditors to the goods. Debtors have no legal obligation to
notify foreign creditors. Consequently, creditors are often left
with little or no right to receive notice of foreign proceedings
which ultimately either reorganize or liquidate a debtor's as-
sets.' Further, a debtor's assets already may have been de-
pleted by those creditors who won the race. Losing creditors
are frequently prevented from recovering equitable distribu-
tions, and in some cases, from realizing any recoveries whatso-
ever. ° Consequently, cross-border investments may be dis-
couraged and increased risks will result in higher interest
rates.
2. Little Predictability for International Investors
An efficient international bankruptcy system needs to act
predictably so that lenders can accurately price loans to multi-
national debtors3 and corporations with multinational subsid-
27. For example, Australian law does not require court appointed trustees to
provide creditors with any notice prior to the institutionalization of agreements
between the trustees and any other creditors. See Interpool Ltd. v. Certain
Freights of the MJV Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988). In this case, U.S.
creditors were not notified before an Australian court ratified an agreement be-
tween a foreign creditor and an Australian debtor. Id.
28. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at
351.
29. See In re McLean Industries, 68 B.R. 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (in
which a Greek creditor brought suit in both Hong Kong and Singapore, seizing
assets (ships) belonging to a U.S. debtor, the proceeds of the sale of which would
have otherwise been distributed among the Greek creditor and several other credi-
tors).
30. See id.
31. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 702, 703.
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iaries can better decide where to incorporate. Prior to involve-
ment in cross-border transactions, lenders and other multina-
tional investors have a strong interest in knowing which court
will have jurisdiction and which country's bankruptcy law will
govern in the event of insolvency proceedings. The current
state of transnational .insolvency law, under the territorialist
approach, affords little predictability to such creditors in that
it provides answers to neither of these questions. Instead,
creditors are often left guessing as to what their rights, and
the rights of their debtors, will be in the event of insolvency.
Substantive areas of bankruptcy law bearing extreme impor-
tance to creditors and multinational investors include priorities
of creditors in a proceeding distributing a debtor's assets, legal
requirements for reorganization and liquidation, and the avoid-
ance of prepetition transfers."
Interpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of the MIV Venture Star
illustrates these existing uncertainties." Interpool was a U.S.
case involving an Australian company undergoing insolvency
proceedings in Australia.34 In this global case, a U.S. court
refused to allow Australian liquidators to administer an Aus-
tralian company's assets located within the United States.35
The case involved an Australian debtor with both foreign and
U.S. creditors.36 The U.S. court's decision ultimately would
determine not only the question of which court would have
jurisdiction of the insolvency proceeding, but also' which law
would apply in distributing the assets. This case illustrates the
uncertainty of the parties to the litigation regarding which law
would ultimately govern the distribution of assets in this insol-
vency proceeding.
3. Inefficient Multiple Proceedings
Multiple proceedings give rise to a third problem with
territorialism concerning the lack of cooperation and coordina-
tion of proceedings. Under territorialism, there is no required
judicial recognition of foreign proceedings. Additionally,
32. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 709.
33. See Interpool, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988).
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See Interpool, 102 B.R. at 377 (concluding that actions taken by a foreign
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courts of one state rarely permit the courts of another to ad-
minister a debtor's assets in a single proceeding. Not only does
this make reorganization virtually impossible, but it also tends
to result in multiple recoveries for some creditors at the ex-
pense of others. 8 Under the "grab rule," creditors race from
state to state to be the first to seize a debtor's assets, and
although creditors may have fully recovered their debt in one
state, no international law prevents them from recovering
again in another state; despite the fact that the debtor's other
creditors have yet to recover anything.39 This practice pre-
vents the equitable distribution of assets among creditors.
Though some courts have attempted to minimize the race-for-
the-assets problem, their efforts are unable to force reciprocity
from other states. Cooperation among.courts allows insolvency
matters to be dealt with both efficiently and effectively. °
In re McLean Industries, Inc. further illustrates the prob-
lem.41 In this case, a U.S. court held that a foreign creditor
was subject to U.S. Bankruptcy Court proceedings because the
creditor "continually transacts business in the U.S."42 The
purpose of this decision was to bind a foreign creditor to a stay
of proceedings issued by the U.S. court, thereby preventing a
U.S. debtor's domestic assets from being seized by any credi-
tors.43 However, the foreign creditor in this case had already
seized the U.S. debtor's assets in Hong Kong and Singapore,44
and the only effect this ruling had on the foreign creditor was
to punish him with a contempt citation for knowingly violating
an automatic stay.4" In a subsequent proceeding,46 the same
court held that "instead of taking steps to discontinue those
court in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding are to be given deference "if and only if"
there would be no substantial violation of the law that would be applied in the
U.S.). The U.S. Bankruptcy Court ultimately refused to defer to simultaneous
proceedings in an Australian court because procedural protections available to
creditors in the U.S. were not given to U.S. creditors in Australia. Id. See also
Concordat, supra note 6.
38. See McLean, 68 B.R. 690.
39. See id.
40. See Farley, supra note 5, at 12.
41. See McLean, 8 B.R. 690.
42. Id. at 692.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 694.
46. See id.
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arrest proceedings [in Hong Kong and Singapore] as the con-
tempt decree required, [that same foreign creditor] took the
active steps of ensuring their continuation."47 Thus, the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court's decision was ineffective in deterring multi-
ple recoveries by a foreign debtor. Although the court ordered
the foreign creditor to pay additional and previously issued
sanctions to the debtor's estate," nothing in its decision effec-
tively prohibited the foreign creditor from continuing to pursue
recoveries in foreign jurisdictions, or courts in other jurisdic-
tions from distributing the U.S. debtor's foreign assets to this
creditor.
4. Parochialism
Despite efforts toward international cooperation in recent
years, the insolvency field has been characterized by extreme
parochialism.49 Resulting in the unequal distribution of as-
sets, parochialism reflects the tendency of courts to "heavily
favor local interests,"" (including the preservation of jobs and
payment of taxes),5 and to rarely permit the courts of one
country to administer the debtor's worldwide assets and
claims. "Most countries give priority to their own taxes but
refuse even to enforce the taxes of other countries unless a
treaty requires it."52 Felixistowe Dock & Railway Co. v. U.S.
Lines, Inc.53 is an excellent example of a country's fear of pa-
rochialism and why states are reluctant to put their domestic
creditors at the mercy of a foreign proceeding. In Felixistowe,
an English court refused to lift its injunction enjoining a U.S.
debtor from removing its assets located in England while the
U.S. debtor was undergoing reorganization in a U.S. Bankrupt-
47. Id. at 293.
48. See id.
49. See Burman & Westbrook, supra note 10, at 1386.
50. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 351.
51. See China: Court Promises Fair Treatment of Debt Repaying, supra note 3.
Discussing the Chinese high court's upcoming adjudication of the Guangdong Inter-
national Trust and Investment Corporation, (GITIC), the high court acknowledged
that "the law gives priority to paying salaries owed to employees and taxes due to
the government ahead of repayments to creditors." Id. This priority is likely to
influence the consideration of the GITIC insolvency, which involves 175 foreign
creditors with an aggregate claim of 32.341 billion Yuan. See id.
52. LoPucki, supra note 1, at 709.
53. [1987] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 76.
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cy Court.54 Noting that to lift the injunction would subject
English creditors to "deliberately preferential treatment" in
U.S. courts, the English court concluded that the injunction
would remain. The English Court's chief concern was protect-
ing its creditors from prejudicial treatment, including U.S.
courts' tendencies to favor their own creditors.55
C. Universalism
The universalist theory of transnational insolvency propos-
es a system in which all countries would defer to, and cooper-
ate with, one another in a single home-country insolvency
proceeding, so that assets could be distributed or a company
could be reorganized in a single proceeding, on a world-wide
basis." Under the universalism approach, states more fre-
quently recognize the authority of other states' insolvency
proceedings.57 In re Culmer illustrates the comity accorded
one state by another and the level of cooperation under this
theory.58 Culmer involved a debtor corporation organized un-
der the laws of The Bahamas, currently undergoing bankrupt-
cy proceedings in that state.59 The issue before the U.S. court
was whether to allow the debtor's assets located within the
U.S. court's jurisdiction to be transferred to The Bahamas and
distributed according to the bankruptcy laws of The Baha-
mas.60 Despite requests made by the debtor's U.S. creditors,
and pursuant to U.S. bankruptcy law,6' the Court allowed the
transfer, thereby recognizing the foreign proceedings.62
The two most widely-discussed forms of universalism in-
clude pure universalism and modified universalism. Under a
pure form of universalism, the home country court63 would
have exclusive jurisdiction over all of the debtor's assets, wher-
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 704. "Under universalism, one court plays
the tune, and everyone else dances." Id. at 699.
57. See Burton, supra note 2, at 210.
58. 26 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (c)(2) (1998).
62. See Culmer, 26 B.R. 621.
63. The nebulous definition of the "home country," and the problems surround-
ing its uncertainty will be addressed in Part II.D of this note.
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ever located, and the sheriffs, marshals, or other law enforce-
ment officers of other countries would enforce that court's
orders.' This approach requires creditors throughout the
world to file their bankruptcy claims in a single court, which
would have exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor's entire insol-
vency case.65 Likewise, all other courts would recognize the
jurisdiction of the court hearing the case, abide by and even
enforce that court's decisions.66 Modified universality, on the
other hand, "attempts to bridge the chasm between [pure]
universality and territoriality. Under modified universality,
one forum hosts [a] central or primary insolvency proceeding,
which is supplemented by ancillary or secondary proceedings
in other jurisdictions."67 These ancillary proceedings may be
considered useful in handling local issues and providing a link
between the primary proceeding in the main forum and the
distribution of the debtor's assets in another forum.68 Under
modified universalism, ancillary proceedings function only to
aid the main proceeding.69 Since this Note agrees with the
majority of scholars in the field of transnational insolvency
that universalism in its pure form is an unrealistic goal,7" the
scope of this note in discussing universalism henceforth will be
limited to the theory of modified universalism.
64. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 705.
65. See Culmer, 26 B.R. 621.
66. See id. at 565.
67. See Culmer, 26 B.R. 621.
68. See id.
69. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 733.
70. See Culmer, 26 B.R. 621. "Pure universality does not work." Id. See also
LoPucld, supra note 1, at 969. "Universalism is unworkable." Id. See also Draft
European Economic Community Bankruptcy Convention, EC Doc. 111/72/80
(1990),(EEC Convention]). Under the EEC Convention, one insolvency proceeding
would be established to handle all of a debtor's insolvency proceedings, one liqui-
dator would be responsible for administering the proceeding both within and out-
side of the debtor's country, and a universal set of insolvency laws would apply.
Id. The EEC Convention never gained enough support to be opened for signature.
See also Burton, supra note 2, at 212. The major criticism of the EEC Convention
was that "it would be unworkable for one forum to administer one centralized
insolvency estate, given the enormous range of differences in countries' insolvency
laws." Manford Balz, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings,
70 AMl. BANKR. L.J. 485, 491 (1996).
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D. Problems Generated Under the Universalist Approach
The universalist theory is often referred to as the most
cooperative system of transnational insolvency.7' Upon appli-
cation, however, cooperation is not always characteristic of this
approach. While the theory proposes that a main proceeding be
held in the debtor's "home country," the determination of
which state is a debtor's home country is often unclear.72 A
debtor's home country may be the court of the country desig-
nated in the debtor's articles of incorporation, the court of the
country in which the debtor is incorporated, where the debtor
owns its most valuable assets, where the debtor has its head-
quarters, where the debtor owes the largest debts, or where
the debtor has the bulk of its assets or operations.73 Essen-
tially, the two main flaws with the application of a universalist
system of transnational insolvency include the ambiguity sur-
rounding which forum will host the central proceeding and the
question of which law will govern main and ancillary proceed-
ings. The second question is often answered by the first. As
such, the two weaknesses with this theory will be discussed in
conjunction.
Most states claiming to embrace the universalism view
often cooperate with foreign proceedings only when the courts
in that jurisdiction are certain that the foreign, court will pro-
vide equal protection to both domestic and foreign creditors.74
The majority of courts are primarily interested in assuring
that creditors located within their jurisdiction will at least
receive the same protections by a foreign court as they would
at home.7 Courts often refuse to grant comity unless the two
states are politically alligned and have very similar substan-
tive and procedural bankruptcy rules.7 6 Accordingly, the wide
71. Used in this context, this note equates cooperation with the extent to
which foreign insolvency proceedings are recognized and enforced by domestic
courts.
72. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 696.
73. See Burton, supra note 2, at 206.
74. See, e.g., Interpool, 102 B.R. at at 377 (stating that actions taken by a
foreign court in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding are to be given deference if, and
only if, there would be no substantial violation of the law that would be applied
in the United States).
75. See id. at 379 ("Protection of US creditors is of utmost importance to this
court.").
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 304(c), listing factors influencing a U.S. court's decision
whether to grant comity to foreign insolvency proceeding. One factor is whether
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level of discretion left to courts serves to undermine the level
of required judicial cooperation in insolvency proceedings un-
der universalism. Several cases illustrate these weaknesses.
Interpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of the M/V Venture Star
is a U.S. case concerning assets located in the United States
but owned by an Australian debtor.77 While the debtor cur-
rently had been undergoing an involuntary liquidation proceed-
ing in Australia, the Australian court-appointed liquidator re-
quested that the U.S. court allow the Australian liquidator to
administer these assets." U.S. creditors, on the other hand,
requested that the court refuse to grant comity to the Austra-
lian proceedings, and thereby prevent the Australian liquidator
from administering the assets. 9 While recognizing the need
for comity, the U.S. court ultimately refused to allow the Aus-
tralian court jurisdiction over the Australian debtor's assets,
concluding that U.S. creditors would not be given the protec-
tion they would receive in a U.S. court under U.S. law in Aus-
tralia." The court noted that both the laws and public policy
of the United States would be violated if the case was permit-
ted to proceed under Australian law.
Felixistowe Dock & Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines, Inc. further
illustrates a court purporting to adopt the universalism theory
of transnational insolvency, while refusing to allow a foreign
court to administer domestically located assets of a foreign
debtor.8' In Felixistowe Dock & Railway, a U.S. debtor had
been undergoing reorganization proceedings in a U.S. court.82
The issue before the English court was whether to allow the
British assets to be subject to the U.S. reorganization proceed-
ing.8" The court noted that the general rule is to ascertain the
domicile of the company in liquidation and to let the Court of
the country of domicile to act as the principal court to govern
the liquidation.' Nevertheless, the court went on to reason
assets will be distributed substantially in accord with the order prescribed in the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Id.
77. 102 B.R. 373.
78. See Id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. 1987, 2 Lloyd's Rep. 76.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
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that, "the desire to act as ancillary to the court where the main
liquidation is going on will not ever make the court give up the
forensic rules which govern the conduct of its own liquida-
tion."85 After concluding that subjecting British creditors to
U.S. jurisdiction would lead to a preferential distribution, the
English court refused to recognize the U.S. proceedings.86
III. ATTEMPTS AT RESOLVING WEAKNESSES EXISTING UNDER
TERRITORIALISM AND UNIVERSALISM THEORIES OF
TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY
The existing disadvantages under the current state of
transnational insolvency law include lack of notice to creditors
of foreign insolvency proceedings, little predictability for inter-
national investors stemming from the fact that creditors are
unable to determine which state will have jurisdiction over
insolvency proceedings and which state's substantive and pro-
cedural rules will govern, inefficient multiple proceedings, and
parochialism.87 The international community has attempted
to resolve these issues by creating various transnational insol-
vency agreements and proposals, including8 the Cross-Border
Insolvency Concordat (Concordat), 9 the European Convention
on Certain International Aspects of Bankruptcy (Istanbul Con-
vention),90 and the European Convention on Insolvency Pro-
ceedings (EU Convention)."' A review of these agreements
illustrates mistakes to be avoided and offers a framework for
shaping future resolutions.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. See supra Part II.
88. This is not a comprehensive list of all of the international agreements and
proposals attempting to resolve the existing flaws of cross-border insolvency. Fur-
ther attempts include The Convention Between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway
and Sweden Regarding Bankruptcy, Nov. 7, 1933, 155 L.N.T.S. 133 (Nordic Con-
vention). Although this Convention has been generally regarded as successful, it is
beyond the scope of this article. "The Nordic countries historically have had simi-
lar traditions and laws, making it somewhat simpler for them to enter into a
treaty." Ian F. Fletcher, International Insolvency: A Case for Study and Treatment,
27 INTML LAW 429, 437 (1993).
89. See Concordat, supra note 6.
90. See Istanbul Convention, supra note 12.
91. See EU Convention, supra note 6.
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A. Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat
In 1996, the International Bar Association92 adopted the
Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat9' as a "framework for har-
monizing cross-border insolvency proceedings"94 and serves
merely as a guideline.95 The Concordat reflects the aspirations
of pure universalism; yet acknowledges the reality of modified
universalism." It requires common claims to be filed in a
main forum,97 yet provides rules governing ancillary proceed-
ings." It also enjoins discriminatory treatment of creditors99
and provides for the recognition in other jurisdictions of the
main forum's discharge of the debtor's obligations.'
The Concordat successfully addresses the lack of notice to
foreign creditors problem in Principle 3, which provides that
92. The Concordat was "developed using bench and bar resources from 25
countries." Farley, supra note 5, at 12. For a more detailed look at the application
of the Concordat, see In re Everfresh Beverages Inc., Ontario Court of Justice,
Toronto (Court File No. 32-077978: December 20, 1995) and U.S. Bankruptcy
Court, S.D.N.Y. (Case No. 95 B 45405: Dec. 20 1995).
93. See Concordat, supra note 6.
94. Kurt H. Nadelmann, Solomons u. Ross and International Bankruptcy Law,
9 MOD. L. REv. 154, 167-68 (1946).
95. A concordat is neither a law nor a treaty, but rather a set of principles
providing guidance, and may be implemented in insolvency proceedings only by
court orders. See Burton, supra note 2, at 230.
96. See Concordat, supra note 6, at 4. Principle 4(C) dictates that a claim
should be filed in one, and only one, Plenary Forum at the election of the holder
of the claim. Id. However, the Principle continues: "If a claim is filed in more
than one plenary forum, distribution must be adjusted so that recovery is not
greater than if the claim were filed in only one forum." Id. While the Concordat
has aspirations reflecting pure universalism, it acknowledges that modified univer-
salism is more realistic and provides for the flexibility required in transnational
insolvency agreements. Thus, the Concordat suggests that there ought to be one
forum but recognizes that this rarely will be the case. See Culmer, supra note 7,
at 573-74.
97. See Concordat, supra note 6. "If an entity or individual with cross-border
connections is the subject of an insolvency proceeding, a single administrative
forum should have primary responsibility for coordinating all insolvency proceed-
ings relating to such entity or individual." Id.
98. See Concordat, supra note 6, at Principle 2(B). "After payment of Secured
Claims and Privileged Claims, as determined by local law, assets in any forum
other than in the Main Forum, shall be turned over to the Main Forum for Distri-
bution." (emphasis added).
99. See id. at Principle 2(D) and 4(E). Principle 4(E) requires that
"[c]lassification of Common Claims should be coordinated among Plenary Fora. Dis-
tributions to Common Claims should be pro-rata regardless of the forum from
which a claim receives a Distribution."
100. See id. at Principle 2(F).
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"[i]f there is more than one forum, the Official Representatives
appointed by each forum shall receive notice of, and have the
right to appear in, all proceedings in any fora."'O' This provi-
sion also helps to resolve the problem of inefficient multiple
proceedings by limiting a debtor's insolvency proceeding to as
few proceedings as possible. Nevertheless, the Concordat does
not explicitly address the recognition of one jurisdiction's deci-
sions by another jurisdiction, other than in Principle 2, which
states that "[a] Discharge granted by the Main Forum should
be recognized in any forum."" 2 This leaves open the question
whether restraining orders and stays will be enforced in for-
eign jurisdictions, and whether states will cooperate with the
distribution of assets and in reorganization proceedings. More-
over, the Concordat does not resolve the difficulties surround-
ing unpredictability for cross-border investors, which stem
from the fact that creditors are unable to determine which
state will have jurisdiction over insolvency proceedings and
which state's substantive and procedural bankruptcy rules will
govern. The Concordat provides minimal guidance for creditors
by merely stating that the main forum should take place in the
state of the debtor's "nerve center."' °3 The "nerve center," ac-
cording to the Concordat, is to be in that jurisdiction where the
board of directors or management are or "where the laws will
be applied to which the firm's creditors will look."0 4 This am-
biguity leaves open the possibility that debtors will "forum
shop,"0 5 and permits a great deal of uncertainty for creditors
attempting to predict which substantive law will apply in the
event of an insolvency. Finally, the Concordat expressly pro-
hibits parochialism in Principle 2, by stating that the Main
Forum may not discriminate against Non-Local Creditors.'
In sum, while the Concordat reflects aspirations of univer-
salism, it appears that it has attempted to gain support by its
generality, and as such, has failed to offer a practical solution
to the existing weaknesses surrounding transnational insolven-
cy. It has sacrificed effectiveness for flexibility. While the Con-
101. Id. at art. 3(A).
102. See Concordat, supra note 6, at Principle 2(F).
103. See id. at 9.
104. Culmer, supra note 7, at 575.
105. Debtors may look for a country whose laws are most favorable to them,
and establish that country as their nerve center.
106. See Concordat, supra note 6, at Principle 2(D).
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cordat requires that all creditors be notified of and have the
right to appear in insolvency proceedings, it fails to prevent
disputes over jurisdiction, and does not provide sufficient guid-
ance to creditors attempting to predict which law will govern
an insolvency proceeding.
B. European Convention on Certain International Aspects of
Bankruptcy (Istanbul Convention)
The Istanbul Convention'0 7 is another example of an at-
tempt at achieving an international insolvency agreement with
universalist aims which ultimately failed due to its excessive
flexibility. Nevertheless, examining the proposals of the Istan-
bul Convention enables one to better evaluate the likely suc-
cess of UNCITRAL's Model Law.
The Istanbul Convention was proposed as a multilateral
treaty by the Council of Europe at Strasbourg in 1989.08 On-
ly six nations signed the Convention, which was never rati-
fied."9 While the Istanbul Convention rejected the single fo-
rum approach, it retained ideals of the more realistic, modified
universalism. It provided that one main proceeding may be
supplemented by secondary proceedings in any state in which
the debtor had an "establishment." ° Certain claims filed in
secondary proceedings would be paid first, from any assets
within the jurisdiction of that state."' Any remainder then
would be forwarded to the main proceeding for further distri-
bution."' Articles 11 and 21 provide that creditors holding
priority and secured claims would be permitted to file their
claims in secondary proceedings in their own state, so long as
107. Istanbul Convention, supra note 12.
108. Id.
109. See id. The signing nations include Belgium, France, Germany, Greece,
Luxembourg, and Turkey.
110. See id. at art. 17.
111. See id. at art. 22, 31. That is, certain creditors were permitted to file
claims within their local jurisdictions, if the debtor had an "establishment" within
that jurisdiction. The Istanbul Convention permitted courts to seize assets within
their jurisdictions and distribute the proceeds to local creditors. If any money
remained, it then would be forwarded to the main proceeding. This effectively
permitted courts in secondary proceedings to assure that local creditors' claims
were satisfied prior to turning over domestically located assets to the main pro-
ceeding for distribution among foreign creditors. Note the issues this presents
regarding parochialism.
112. See id.
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the debtor had assets located within that state."' While pro-
viding for flexibility, Articles 11 and 21 perpetuate problems
surrounding parochialism in that they operate to allow courts
to ensure that domestic creditors be paid in full before any
assets are released to the main proceeding for distribution
among foreign creditors." The Istanbul Convention attempts
to remedy this problem in Article 5, which provides that credi-
tors who obtain partial payment of a claim in one insolvency
proceeding may not receive a distribution from any other insol-
vency proceeding until the remaining creditors have received
an equal, pro rata portion of their claims."' While this may
prevent a "race for the assets,""6 Article 5 applies only to un-
secured creditors, and has no effect on the secured creditors
receiving "first shot" at assets located within their domestic ju-
risdictions under Articles 11 and 21.1" The Convention at-
tempts further safeguards against inequitable distribution re-
sulting from secondary proceedings in Articles 24 and 27. Arti-
cle 24 provides that creditors in the main proceeding entitled
to receive a dividend from assets coming from secondary pro-
ceedings shall be treated equally, regardless of any privileges
or other exceptions to the bankruptcy rules of the main or
secondary proceedings."' Rather, Article 27 provides that a
distribution in the secondary proceeding may not take place
without prior consent from the main proceeding's liquida-
tor."' Such consent may not be withheld if creditors from the
secondary proceeding requesting the distribution are able to
prove that the financial interests of the creditors of the main
proceeding are not affected by the distribution. 20 While this
is not a foolproof method of preventing parochialism, Articles
5, 24, and 27 collectively offer a reasonable solution to mini-
mize parochialism while providing flexibility to recognize the
sovereignty of individual states conducting secondary proceed-
ings.
113. See id. at arts. 11, 21.
114. See id.
115. See id. at art. 5.
116. For a discussion of the "race for the assets" problem existing under
territorialism, see Part II.B.2.
117. See Istanbul Convention, supra note 12.
118. Id. at art. 24.
119. Id. at art. 27.
120. See id.
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The notice issue is resolved by Article 30 of the Conven-
tion, which provides that as sooii as any proceedings are
opened (either main or secondary), the competent authority of
that proceeding or the liquidator appointed shall promptly and
individually inform known creditors residing in other jurisdic-
tions.'2 Such notice must contain appropriate details, includ-
ing time limits and measures to be taken in the
proceedings. 22
The Istanbul Convention appears to have successfully
addressed the inefficient multiple proceedings weakness exist-
ing under territorialism. Article 4 provides that "when the
bankruptcy is opened in the central proceeding, the court
which first gave judgment shall alone be considered compe-
tent."" Article 16 provides that any debtor declared bank-
rupt by the main proceeding is, "by virtue of this fact alone," to
be declared bankrupt in all secondary proceedings. 24 More-
over, secondary proceedings are not permitted to take place
until creditors have produced the decision opening insolvency
proceedings in the main proceeding.
25
The Istanbul Convention, however, has failed to provide
adequate predictability to creditors attempting to determine
which state would host the main proceeding. The forum for the
main proceeding is referred to as the "centre of [the debtor's]
main interests. 26 While Article 4 provides that "the place of
the registered office shall be presumed to be the centre of their
main interests,"'27 this merely creates a rebuttable presump-
tion.12 Under this provision, both creditors and debtors
foreseeably may argue that the forum for the main proceeding
may be either where the debtor is incorporated, where the
debtor conducts the majority of its operations, (which may
generate further disputes), the state of the debtor's headquar-
ters, or any number of other jurisdictions. While debtors and
creditors may have difficulty predicting the forum for the main
proceeding, the Istanbul Convention enables secured creditors
121. Id. at art. 30.
122. See id.
123. Istanbul Convention, supra note 12, at art. 4(2)(b).
124. Id. at art. 16.
125. See id. at art. 17.
126. Id. at art. 4(1).
127. Id.
128. See Burton, supra note 2, at 213, n.41.
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to predict which state's bankruptcy law will govern their insol-
vency proceedings, since secured creditors are permitted to file
claims in their local jurisdictions provided that the debtor has
assets and an "establishment" in that jurisdiction.129 More-
over, Article 19 provides that secondary proceedings are gov-
erned by the bankruptcy law of the state conducting the pro-
ceeding. 30
Perhaps the predominant weakness with the Istanbul
Convention lies within the Convention's "opt-out" provisions,
which enable states to refuse to recognize a foreign liquidator's
powers.'' The "opt-out" provisions further enable states to
disregard proceedings in the main forum.'32 In these ways,
the Istanbul Convention illustrates the difficulties in creating
an international agreement which is not only flexible enough
to be accepted by a sufficient number of states, but is also
strong enough to resolve the existing weaknesses surrounding
transnational insolvency.
C. European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings (EU
Convention)
Utilizing most of the provisions from the Istanbul Conven-
tion as its framework, the EU Convention was intended to
"ensure recognition and enforcement of judgments [and] to
allow for secondary insolvency proceedings."33 Thus, the EU
Convention, like its predecessors, adopts the modified univer-
salism theory and attempts to blend "a framework of member
state cooperation with a recognition of the unique aspects of
member state's laws."134 Article 3(1) of the EU Convention
reflects the modified universalism approach by providing that
transnational insolvency proceedings shall be opened at a main
proceeding,3 5 while Article 3(2) allows secondary proceedings
to be commenced in fora where the debtor "possesses an estab-
lishment."'36 Moreover, the secondary proceedings shall be
129. Istanbul Convention, supra note 12, at arts. 11, 21.
130. Id. at art. 19.
131. Id. at arts. 6-15.
132. See id. at arts. 16-28.
133. EU Convention, supra note 6.
134. Burton, supra note 2, at 218.
135. EU Convention, supra note 6, at art. 3(1).
136. Id. at art 3(2). See also art. 16(2). "Recognition of the proceedings referred
to in Article 3(1) shall not preclude the opening of the proceedings referred to in
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subordinate to the main proceedings, 1' as is characteristic of
modified universalism. Unfortunately, Article 49 provided that
the Convention shall not enter into force until it has been
ratified by all the Member States of the European Union.'38
The EU Convention was agreed to in theory by all of the fif-
teen European Union Member States, but was signed by only
fourteen of them."9 The United Kingdom refused to sign at
the last minute, when its beef exports were reduced due to
mad cow disease.40 Consequently, the EU Convention failed
to take effect.
In evaluating the extent to which the EU Convention re-
solves the weaknesses existing under the current state of
transnational insolvency law, one may begin by addressing the
notice issue. Article 40 provides that as soon as an insolvency
proceeding is opened in a Contracting State, "the court of that
State having jurisdiction or the liquidator appointed by it shall
immediately inform known creditors who have their habitual
residences, domiciles or registered offices in the other Con-
tracting States."'4 ' As such, the EU Convention adequately
remedies the lack of notice problem. Unfortunately, it does not
resolve the predictability issue.
The EU Convention possesses the same deficiencies as the
Istanbul Convention regarding the ambiguity surrounding
which state will host the main proceeding. Article 3(1) of the
Article 3(2) by a court in another Contracting State. The latter proceedings shall
be secondary proceedings within the meaning of Chapter III." Id. Under the EU
Convention, proceedings only may proceed in jurisdictions of Contracting States.
See arts. 3 and 16. An establishment is defined as "any place of operations where
the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means and
goods." Id. at art. 2(h).
137. See id. at art. 33. "The court, which opened the secondary proceedings,
shall stay the process of liquidation in whole or in part on receipt of a request
from the liquidator in the main proceedings." Id. For restrictions on the ability of
the main proceeding to issue a stay on the secondary proceeding, see art. 33.
138. EU Convention, supra note 6, at art. 49(2).
139. See Burton, supra note 2, at 208.
140. See Culmer, supra note 7, at 567. See also Burton, supra note 2, at 223-
24. "The United Kingdom refused to sign the EU Convention in retaliation for the
total beef ban which the EU had imposed on March 27, 1996, because British
cattle were suffering from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy [more commonly
referred to as Mad Cow Disease]. Four decades of working toward a European
insolvency treaty thus came to a disappointing halt on the EU's May 23, 1996,
deadline." Id.
141. EU Convention, supra note 6, at art. 40(1).
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EU Convention provides that "the courts of the Contracting
State within the territory of which the centre of a debtor's
main interests is situated shall have jurisdiction to open insol-
vency proceedings."' While revisiting the dubious definition
of a main proceeding, the EU Convention may be commended
for explicitly providing that "the place of the registered office
shall be presumed to be the centre of its main interests in the
absence of proof to the contrary."" Although this creates a
stronger definition of the main proceeding, the question of ac-
ceptable and sufficient proof for rebutting this presumption
remains unanswered. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the main
proceeding is not entirely provided for by the EU Convention.
Nevertheless, once the forum of the main proceeding is agreed
upon, unsecured creditors are assured that the bankruptcy law
governing their proceedings will be that of the State where the
main proceedings are opened.' Secured creditors filing
claims in secondary proceedings are similarly assured that "the
law applicable to secondary proceedings shall be that of the
Contracting State within the territory of which the secondary
proceedings are opened."'"
Like the Istanbul Convention, the EU Convention success-
fully resolves the problem of inefficient multiple proceedings
that stems from the lack of judicial recognition of foreign pro-
ceedings and results in the inequitable distribution of assets,
namely, multiple recoveries by some creditors, and partial or
no recoveries by others. Article 16 provides that proceedings in
the main proceeding shall be recognized and given effect in all
other Contracting States,' and Article 25 adequately pro-
vides for the recognition of secondary proceedings.'47 More-
over, Article 31 requires the liquidator in the main proceedings
and the liquidators in the secondary proceedings to communi-
cate any information which may be relevant to the other pro-
ceedings.'48 In addition, Article 20 ensures equal treatment of
creditors by providing that "a creditor who has, in the course of
insolvency proceedings, obtained a dividend on his claim shall
142. Id at art. 3(1).
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. See id. at arts. 3, 4.
145. EU Convention, supra note 6, at art. 28.
146. Id. at art. 16(1).
147. Id. at art. 25(1).
148. Id. at art. 31(1).
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share in distributions made in other proceedings only where
creditors of the same ranking or category have, in those other
proceedings, obtained an equivalent dividend."4 9
In sum, the EU Convention, if ratified by all fifteen Mem-
ber States, would have successfully resolved the issues regard-
ing lack of notice and inefficient multiple proceedings. Lack of
predictability regarding applicable jurisdiction and bankruptcy
law would have been partially settled, and parochialism does
not appear to have been explicitly addressed in the EU Con-
vention. Moreover, the EU Convention would have been able to
provide the flexibility integral to international insolvency
agreements while preserving the strength necessary for resolv-
ing the majority of existing weaknesses in cross-border bank-
ruptcy law. Unlike the Istanbul Convention, the EU Conven-
tion contained no "opt-out" provision. Instead, it provided that
Contracting States may refuse to recognize or enforce insolven-
cy proceedings opened in other Contracting States "where the
effects of such recognition or enforcement would be manifestly
contrary to that State's public policy, in particular, its funda-
mental principles or the constitutional rights and liberties of
the individual."5 '
IV. UNCITRAL's MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
As a result of the historical failed attempts at drafting an
insolvency treaty matching the ideals of modified universalism
with the proper balance of flexibility and strength, the United
Nations Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
chose instead to create a model law which would become effec-
tive only when voluntarily adopted by United Nations Member
States as part of their domestic law.'5 ' Nevertheless, the pri-
or "failed attempts," including the Concordat, the Istanbul
Convention, and the EU Convention have provided a consider-
able foundation for the Model Law.
52
Demonstrating an acceptance of modified universalism, the
Model Law provides for main... and secondary proceed-
149. Id. at art. 20(2).
150. Id. at art. 26.
151. See Burman & Westbrook, supra note 10, at 1387.
152. See id.
153. Model Law, supra note 8, at arts. 2(b), 17(2)(a).
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ings.'54 Like its ancestors, the Model Law places the main
proceeding "in the State where the debtor has the centre of its
main interests,"'55 and acknowledges secondary proceedings
in states where the debtor has an establishment.' Unlike its
predecessors, however, the Model Law provides that upon
recognition of the main proceeding, commencement or continu-
ation of individual proceedings in any other jurisdiction con-
cerning the debtor's assets, rights, obligations, or liabilities
may be stayed, 5 ' and the right to transfer, encumber or oth-
erwise dispose of any of the debtor's assets may be suspend-
ed. 58
A. The Successful Resolution of the Four Weaknesses in
International Insolvency Law
Not only has the Model Law amply provided for the resolu-
tion of the four existing weaknesses with the current state of
transnational insolvency law,'59 it has surpassed its predeces-
sors in furthering a practical application of cooperation as well
as the equitable distribution of assets. In fact, the Preamble
acknowledges as its purpose the resolution of three of the
weaknesses characteristic of the current vacuum in transna-
tional insolvency law.6 '
154. See id. at art. 17(2)(b).
155. Id.
156. See id. at 2(c). The definition of "establishment," provided in art. 2(f) is
verbatim to the definition given to the same term by the EU Convention, except
for the fact that the Model Law adds the words "or services" to the end of its
definition. See EU Convention, at art. 2(h); Model Law at art. 2(f).
157. Id. at art. 20(1)(a-b).
158. See id. at art. 20(1)(c).
159. Again, these weaknesses include:
1. The inefficiency of multiple proceedings which stems from the lack of
recognition of foreign proceedings;
2. The failure to provide creditors with notification of foreign proceedings;
3. Lack of predictability stemming from the fact that foreign investors
will be unable to anticipate which state will have jurisdiction over insol-
vency proceedings and which state's bankruptcy rules will govern these
proceedings; and
4. Parochialism, which reflects the tendency of courts to favor domestic
creditors over foreign creditors.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
160. See Model Law, supra note 8, at Preamble (stating purposes of the Model
Law to include: (a) promotion of cooperation between the courts of the enacting
state and foreign states involved in cases of cross-border insolvency (inefficient
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1. Lack of Predictability: Which Jurisdiction? Which Law?
While the Model Law uses the familiar ambiguous terms
to define which state will host the main proceeding,'61 it pro-
vides additional safeguards that minimize the possibility of
conflicting interpretations. Like the EU Convention, the Model
Law explicitly provides that "in absence of proof to the con-
trary, the debtor's registered office, or habitual residence in the
case of an individual, is presumed to be the centre of the
debtor's main interests. 62 In addition, Article 8 provides
that when interpreting provisions of the Model Law, "regard is
to be had to its international origin and to the need to promote
uniformity in its application and the observance of good
faith."" Thus, a variety of interpretations regarding the
"centre of interests" state will not be tolerated if the Model
Law is earnestly applied. While the Model Law does not explic-
itly dictate which state's bankruptcy rules will govern proceed-
ings, it implies that each proceeding will be governed by the
domestic law of the state having jurisdiction over the main
proceeding."M Moreover, the Model Law provides some sub-
stantive and procedural rules to govern both main and second-
ary proceedings. 65 Collectively, these provisions provide in-
ternational creditors and investors with sufficient information
for predicting with a great degree of accuracy, which law will
govern insolvency proceedings. Thus, the Model Law provides
international investors and creditors with the greatest degree
of predictability that is possible without providing overly-strin-
gent and unworkable standards.
2. The Failure to Provide Creditors with Notification of
Foreign Proceedings
The Model Law is equally successful at ensuring that
multiple proceedings weakness); (b) greater legal certainty for trade and invest-
ment (predictability weakness); and (c) fair and efficient administration of cross-
border insolvencies that protects the interests of all creditors (parochialism weak-
ness). Id. The remaining weakness, notice, is not listed as a purpose of the Model
Law in its Preamble, but is expressly provided for throughout the Model Law.
161. See id. (referring to the "centre of the debtor's main interests).
162. See Model Law, supra note 8, at art. 16 (3).
163. Id. at art. 8.
164. Id. at arts. 13(1-2), 6, 7, 21(3).
165. Id. at arts. 21(1-2), 22.
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foreign creditors will receive notice of insolvency proceedings.
Article 14 provides that whenever notification is to be given to
creditors in the enacting state, "such notification shall also be
given to the known creditors that do not have addresses in this
State."'66 Further notice requirements provide that the court
may order appropriate steps to be taken with a view toward
notifying any creditor whose address is not yet known.'67 The
Model Law goes on to provide that such notification shall be
made to the foreign creditors individually,'68 rather than by
mere publication, shall indicate a reasonable time period for
filing claims,'69 shall specify the place for filing,7 ' and shall
contain any other information required to be included in such
notification to domestic creditors under domestic law.'7 '
3. Inefficient Multiple Proceedings: Recognition and
Coordination of Proceedings
The Model Law makes extensive provisions resolving the
problem of inefficient multiple proceedings by requiring Mem-
ber States to cooperate and provide good faith recognition of
foreign proceedings.'72 Member States are required to recog-
nize foreign proceedings if their courts are provided either with
a certified copy of the decision commencing the foreign pro-
ceeding, 7 3 a certificate from the foreign court affirming the
existence of the foreign proceeding,' 74 or "any other evidence
acceptable to the court of the existence of the foreign proceed-
ing.""'75 Not only does the Model Law empower courts to coop-
erate with foreign proceedings, but it directs them to do so to
the maximum extent possible.'76 In addition, the Model Law
demands that an application for recognition of a foreign pro-
ceeding be decided at the earliest possible time.'
77
166. Id. at art. 14(1).
167. See id.
168. See Model Law, supra note 8, at art. 14(2).
169. See id. at art. 14(3)(a).
170. See id.
171. See id. at art. 14(3)(c).
172. Id. at arts. 8, 15-32.
173. See Model Law, supra note 8, at art. 15(2)(a).
174. See id. at art. 15(2)(b).
175. Id. at art. 15(2)(c).
176. Id. at art. 25(1).
177. Model Law, supra note 8, at art. 17(3).
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Foreign representatives are entitled to apply directly to
courts in Member States,178 to commence proceedings in
Member States,7 ' and to participate in proceedings in Mem-
ber States' with the same rights as creditors in that
State. ' Also, recognition of a foreign proceeding is proof that
the debtor is insolvent.8 2 The Model Law further provides
that secondary proceedings must be consistent with foreign
main proceedings,'" and that if secondary proceedings have
taken place before the main proceeding has been commenced,
any relief granted in the secondary proceeding shall be re-
viewed by the court of the main proceeding and modified or
terminated if inconsistent with the main proceeding.' In
sum, UNCITRAL's Model Law has successfully resolved the
problem of inefficient multiple proceedings.
4. Parochialism: The Tendency of Courts to Favor Local
Creditors
The Model Law furnishes foreign creditors with satisfacto-
ry protection against parochialism. Article 13 provides that
"foreign creditors have the same rights regarding the com-
mencement of, and participation in" a proceeding as creditors
residing in the State in which the proceeding is taking
place." In addition, Article 8 directs Member States who
have enacted the Model Law to apply its provisions in good
faith.18
6
B. Shortcomings Of The Model Law
While the Model Law has no explicit "opt out" provisions,
it does provide Member States with a way out of compliance, to
some extent. Article 6 provides that courts may refuse to take
any action governed by the Model Law "if the action would be
178. See id. at art. 9.
179. See id. at art. 11.
180. See id. at art. 12.
181. See Model Law, supra note 8, at art. 13(1).
182. See id. at art. 31.
183. Id. at art. 30(a).
184. Id. at art. 29(b)(i).
185. Model Law, supra note 8, at art. 13(1).
186. Id. at art. 8.
20011 1203
BROOK. J. INTL L.
manifestly contrary to public policy."'87 Moreover, Article 22
provides that a court may refuse to grant relief to a foreign
creditor if the court is not satisfied that the interests of the
creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor,
are adequately protected.'88 The Model Law also provides
that Member States may refuse to entrust the distribution of
any of the debtor's assets located within that state to the main
proceeding, if the court is not satisfied that the interests of
creditors within that state are adequately protected.'89 While
some critics logically may view the combination of these provi-
sions as undermining the goals of universalism, such a conclu-
sion would be erroneous. The precepts surrounding the Model
Law include cooperation to the maximum extent possible 9 '
and the good faith application of its provisions.'' Although
these provisions may be interpreted by some as allowing Mem-
ber States great latitude in deciding whether to recognize for-
eign proceedings, this would not be within the spirit of the
Model Law, and under Articles 8 and 25, likely would consti-
tute a violation. Instead, it may be argued that these provi-
sions allow states to cooperate with one another in administer-
ing bankruptcy proceedings, without sacrificing sovereignty or
individual public policies, which would otherwise be applied in
purely domestic proceedings.
V. A WORKABLE SOLUTION IN THE FIELD OF TRANSNATIONAL
INSOLVENCY
While the Model Law may not resolve every problem with
the existing state of international insolvency law, it is by far,
the most promising step toward alleviating a majority of the
existing obstacles. In light of UNCITRAL's Model Law, this
note rejects "the hard reality of territorialism" 9'" and along
with the United States 106th Congress, urges United Nations
Member States to embrace the Model Law as part of their
domestic bankruptcy law. UNCITRAL's Model Law is the sin-
gle transnational insolvency agreement providing the formula
187. Id. at art. 6.
188. Id. at art. 22(1).
189. Id. at art. 21(2).
190. Model Law, supra note 8, at art. 25.
191. See id. at art. 8.
192. Culmer, supra note 7, at 565.
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for the proper balance of the requisite strength and flexibility.
Its provisions earnestly command cooperation and its rigidity
is realistic. Countries will always have verifiable concerns
about the integrity and preservation of their jurisdiction. The
Model Law delicately preserves this integrity while ensuring
cooperation among courts that allows the administration of
insolvency proceedings to be dealt with effectively, equitably
and efficiently. Insolvency proceedings now affect investment
and commercial interests well beyond the country in which
they take place,'93 and nearly a third of U.S.-based, large,
publicly held companies own property in foreign countries.'94
If we hope to continue as a prosperous global economy, the
time to enact the Model Law is now. United Nations Member
States have an obligation to protect foreign investment, and
the Model Law presents them with an excellent opportunity to
do so.
Sara Isham*
193. See Burman and Westbrook, supra note 10, at 1386.
194. See LoPucki, supra note 1.
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